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Rollover Risk and Market Freezes
Abstract
The sub-prime crisis of 2007 and 2008 has been characterized by a sudden freeze in the market
for short-term, secured borrowing. We present a model that can explain a sudden collapse in
the amount that can be borrowed against assets with little credit risk. The borrowing in this
model takes the form of asset-backed commercial paper that has to be rolled over several times
before the underlying assets mature and their true value is revealed. In the event of default, the
creditors (holders of commercial paper) can seize the collateral. We assume that there is a small
cost of liquidating the assets. The debt capacity of the assets (the maximum amount that can be
borrowed using the assets as collateral) depends on how information about the quality of the asset
is revealed. In one scenario, there is a constant probability that “bad news” is revealed each period
and, in the absence of bad news, the value of the assets is high. We call this the “optimistic”
scenario because, in the absence of bad news, the expected value of the assets is increasing over
time. By contrast, in another scenario, there is a constant probability that “good news” is revealed
each period and, in the absence of good news, the value of the assets is low. We call this the
“pessimistic” scenario because, in the absence of good news, the expected value of the assets is
decreasing over time. In the optimistic scenario, the debt capacity of the assets is equal to the
fundamental value (the expected NPV), whereas in the pessimistic scenario, the debt capacity is
below the fundamental value and is decreasing in the liquidation cost and frequency of rollovers.
In the limit, as the number of rollovers becomes unbounded, the debt capacity goes to zero even
for an arbitrarily small default risk. Our model explains why markets for rollover debt, such as
asset-backed commercial paper, may experience sudden freezes. The model also provides an explicit
formula for the haircut in secured borrowing or repo transactions.
J.E.L. Classification: G12, G21, G24, G32, G33, D8.
Keywords: financial crisis, market freeze, credit risk, liquidation cost, haircut, repo,
secured borrowing, asset-backed commercial paper.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
One of the many striking features of the sub-prime crisis of 2007 and 2008 has been the
sudden freeze in the market for the rollover of short-term debt. While the rationing of firms
in the unsecured borrowing market is not uncommon and has a long-standing theoretical
underpinning (see, for example, the seminal work of Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), what is
puzzling is the almost complete inability of financial institutions to issue (or roll over) short-
term debt backed by assets with relatively low credit risk. From a theoretical standpoint,
this is puzzling because the ability to pledge assets and provide collateral has been considered
one of the most important tools available to firms in order to get around credit rationing
(Bester, 1985). From an institutional perspective, the inability to borrow overnight against
high-quality assets has been a striking market failure that effectively led to the demise of
a substantial part of investment banking in the United States. More broadly, it led to the
collapse in the United States, the United Kingdom, and other countries of banks and financial
institutions that had relied on the rollover of short-term wholesale debt in the asset-backed
commercial paper (ABCP) and overnight secured repo markets.
The first such collapse occurred in the Summer of 2007. On July 31, 2007, two Bear
Stearns hedge funds based in the Cayman Islands and invested in sub-prime assets filed for
bankruptcy. Bear Stearns also blocked investors in a third fund from withdrawing money. In
the week to follow, more news of problems with sub-prime assets hit the markets. Finally, on
August 7, 2007, BNP Paribas halted withdrawals from three investment funds and suspended
calculation of the net asset values because it could not “fairly” value their holdings:1
“[T]he complete evaporation of liquidity in certain market segments of the US
securitization market has made it impossible to value certain assets fairly regard-
less of their quality or credit rating. . . Asset-backed securities, mortgage loans,
especially sub-prime loans don’t have any buyers. . . Traders are reluctant to bid
on securities backed by risky mortgages because they are difficult to sell on. . .
The situation is such that it is no longer possible to value fairly the underlying
US ABS assets in the three above-mentioned funds.”
This announcement appeared to cause investors in asset backed commercial paper (ABCP),
primarily money market funds, to shy away from further financing of ABCP structures.
These investors could no longer be guaranteed that there was minimal risk in ABCP debt.
In particular, many ABCP vehicles had recourse to sponsor banks that set up these vehicles
as off-balance-sheet structures but provided them with liquidity and credit enhancements.
1Source: “BNP Paribas Freezes Funds as Loan Losses Roil Markets” (Bloomberg.com, August 9, 2008).
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If ABCP debt could not be rolled over, the sponsor banks would have to effectively take
assets back onto their balance-sheets. But, given the assets had little liquidity, the banks’
ability to raise additional finance – typically rollover debt in the form of financial CP –
would be limited too. Money market funds thus faced the risk that the assets underlying
ABCP would be liquidated at fire-sale prices. This liquidation and rollover risk produced a
“freeze” in the ABCP market, raised concerns about counter-party risk amongst the banks,
and caused LIBOR to shoot upwards. The sub-prime crisis truly took hold as the European
Central Bank pumped 95 billion Euros in overnight lending into the market that same day
in response to the sudden demand for cash from banks.
The failure of Bear Stearns in mid-March 2008 was the next example of a market freeze.2
As an intrinsic part of its business, Bear Stearns relied day-to-day on its ability to obtain
short-term finance through secured borrowing. Beginning late Monday, March 10, 2008 and
increasingly through that week, rumors spread about liquidity problems at Bear Stearns and
eroded investor confidence in the firm. Even though Bear Stearns continued to have high
quality collateral to provide as security for borrowing,3 counterparties became less willing
to enter into collateralized funding arrangements with the firm. This resulted in a crisis of
confidence late in the week, where counterparties to Bear Stearns were unwilling to make
even secured funding available to the firm on customary terms. This unwillingness to fund on
a secured basis placed enormous stress on the liquidity of Bear Stearns. On Tuesday, March
11, the holding company liquidity pool declined from $18.1 billion to $11.5 billion (see Figure
1). On Thursday, March 13, Bear Stearns’ liquidity pool fell sharply and continued to fall
on Friday. In the end, the market rumors about Bear Stearns’ liquidity problems became
self-fulfilling and led to the near failure of the firm. Bear Stearns was adequately capitalized
at all times during the period from March 10 to March 17, up to and including the time of its
agreement to be acquired by J.P. Morgan Chase. Even at the time of its sale, Bear Stearns’
capital and its broker dealers’ capital exceeded supervisory standards. In particular, the
capital ratio of Bear Stearns was well in excess of the 10% level used by the Federal Reserve
Board in its well-capitalized standard.
— Figure 1 about here —
In his analysis of the failure of Bear Stearns, the Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke
observed:4
2The discussion that follows is based on the Security and Exchange Commission’s Chairman Christopher
Cox’s Letter to the Basel Committee in Support of New Guidance on Liquidity Management, available at:
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-48.htm
3This high quality collateral mainly consisted of highly rated mortgage-backed assets which had low but
not inconsequential credit risk by this time in the sub-prime crisis.
4The quotes are based on Ben Bernanke’s remarks to the Risk Transfer Mechanisms and Financial Stability
Workshop at the Bank for International Settlements, May 29, 2008.
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“[U]ntil recently, short-term repos had always been regarded as virtually risk-
free instruments and thus largely immune to the type of rollover or withdrawal
risks associated with short-term unsecured obligations. In March, rapidly un-
folding events demonstrated that even repo markets could be severely disrupted
when investors believe they might need to sell the underlying collateral in illiquid
markets. Such forced asset sales can set up a particularly adverse dynamic, in
which further substantial price declines fan investor concerns about counterparty
credit risk, which then feed back in the form of intensifying funding pressures. . . In
light of the recent experience, and following the recommendations of the Pres-
ident’s Working Group on Financial Markets (2008), the Federal Reserve and
other supervisors are reviewing their policies and guidance regarding liquidity
risk management to determine what improvements can be made. In particular,
future liquidity planning will have to take into account the possibility of a sudden
loss of substantial amounts of secured financing.”
1.2 Model and results
Our paper is an attempt to provide a theoretical model of such market freezes. We consider
the debt capacity of a finitely-lived asset when (i) the debt is short-term in nature and,
hence, needs to be rolled over; (ii) there is the risk of a fire sale in the event the borrower
defaults and the current lender needs to seize and liquidate the underlying assets; and (iii)
the arrival of information about the quality of the assets may be “pessimistic” in nature (in a
sense to be formalized below). These are essentially the features alluded to in the preceding
discussion of the conditions surrounding the freeze in the market for ABCP and the collapse
of Bear Stearns.
When debt is short-term in nature, it is natural to assume that uncertainty about the
credit risk of the underlying asset will not be fully resolved by the date of the next rollover.
In fact, debt may have to be rolled over several times before information about the asset is
completely revealed. In the period of the 2007-2008 crisis, there were numerous examples of
the slow release of information about the quality of assets held by banks or used as collateral
for asset-backed securities. On the one hand, the difficulty of valuing complex securities
or assets for which no markets existed led to repeated changes in the losses announced by
financial institutions. On the other, these same institutions were loath to reveal all their
holdings of troubled assets. For both these reasons, the true extent of the financial distress
dribbled out over many months. In these circumstances, a lender that is unwilling or unable
to extend credit until the assets mature has to take into account the risk that the borrower
will not be able to find another lender, that is, to roll over his debt. Does such rollover risk
diminish the debt capacity of an asset? The answer to this question depends crucially on
the way in which information is released relative to the rate at which debt is being rolled
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over.
Although the preceding discussion makes it clear that the release of information is en-
dogenous to the market, from the point of view of lenders it can be treated as an exogenous
signal. We consider two different information structures, that is, two different assumptions
about the signals that reach the commercial paper market. In each structure, there is a
constant small hazard of news arriving in each time period, but the nature of the news
is different. The first structure, which we call the “optimistic” structure, is illustrated in
Figure 2. In the optimistic information structure, at each rollover date, either “bad news”
is released, revealing that the assets underlying the lending have no value, or no news is
released. If bad news never arrives, the value of the asset is positive, so obviously no news
is “good news”. The information structure is “optimistic” in the sense that, as time passes
and bad news has not arrived, the probability that the value of the assets will be positive is
increasing.
The standard result in efficient markets is that the debt capacity5 of an asset is equal
to its NPV or “fundamental” value. We show in the sequel that this result holds when
the information structure is optimistic, the debt capacity of an asset is simply equal to the
expected present value of the asset’s cash flows at maturity. In other words, there is credit
risk but no rollover risk.
— Figures 2 and 3 about here —
The standard result breaks down, however, when the information structure is “pes-
simistic.” The pessimistic structure is illustrated in Figure 3. In the pessimistic structure,
there is a constant hazard at each rollover date that “good news” is released, revealing that
the value of the asset is high. If good news never arrives, the value of the asset is zero, so in
this case no news is “bad news.” The structure is pessimistic in the sense that, as time passes
and good news has not arrived, the probability that the asset will have no value increases.
Intuitively, this information structure is pessimistic in the sense that investors are waiting
for good news and the outlook gets worse each time good news fails to arrive.
Our main objective in this paper is to characterize the rollover debt capacity6 of an asset
used as collateral for short-term borrowing. Using the methods developed in this paper,
we can show that, under the pessimistic information structure, the rollover debt capacity
of an asset is always smaller than its buy-to-hold debt capacity.7 We also establish that
the rollover debt capacity is declining in the rollover frequency, liquidation cost, and credit
5The debt capacity is the maximum amount of debt that can be obtained using the asset as collateral.
6The rollover debt capacity is the maximum amount of debt that can be obtained when the debt has to
be rolled over each period.
7The buy-to-hold debt capacity refers to the maximum amount of debt that could be obtained if the term
of the debt guaranteed that the borrower could hold the assets to maturity without risk of liquidation.
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risk. In fact, our main result shows that the debt capacity of an asset tends to zero as the
number of debt rollovers grows without bound. We call this phenomenon a “market freeze.”
This remarkable and perhaps counter-intuitive result holds for arbitrarily small credit risks,
capturing the scenario that Bear Stearns experienced during its failure in March 2008.
The intuition for the “market-freeze” result can be explained as follows. In the pessimistic
case, things are going to get worse unless “good news” arrives. When the rate at which good
news is rationally expected to arrive is much slower than the rate at which the debt has to
be rolled over, the borrower anticipates that he will still be in the pessimistic scenario with
probability close to one at the next roll over date. Then debt capacity today is essentially
determined by debt capacity tomorrow. As the final rollover date approaches, however, the
fundamental value of the assets is zero in the pessimistic case, so the debt capacity is zero
as well. By backwards induction the debt capacity at any preceding date in the pessimistic
case must be close to zero as well.
A similar backward induction argument in the optimistic case leads to the opposite
result, since the fundamental value – and hence the debt capacity – increases over time as
the maturity date is approached in the optimistic case.
The two special information structures can be nested in a more general regime-switching
model. More precisely, we assume there are two states, a pessimistic state and an optimistic
state. The value of the asset is determined by the state of the economy in the final period
when the asset matures. If the terminal state is optimistic, the value of the asset is positive;
otherwise, it is zero. In each period, the economy switches, with some small probability,
from the prevailing state to the other one.8 We show that, as the rollover frequency becomes
unbounded, the debt capacity in the optimistic state is bounded away from zero and in the
pessimistic state tends to zero. In particular, a sudden switch in the market’s expectation
from the optimistic state to the pessimistic one can cause the market for rollover asset-backed
debt to freeze.
A sudden market freeze arises in the model because of a change in investors’ rational
expectations. Instead of good news being the default state and bad news being a dreaded
surprise, now bad news is the default state and good news the hoped for surprise. If good
news is likely to arrive at a slower rate than the debt has to be rolled over, the effect on debt
capacity may be catastrophic, even if the fundamental value of the asset (the probability
distribution over terminal states) has not changed significantly.
Something like a switch from optimistic to pessimistic states or expectations may have
happened in the second quarter of 2007. The cause was growing awareness of the poor
8An imperfect analogy is to think about an economy whose state is characterized by a regime-switching
model. When it is more likely to be in the healthy state, the more it stays in that state, the less likely it is
to switch to the recession state before the assets mature. Conversely, when it is more likely in a recession,
the more it stays in that state, the less likely it is to switch to the healthy state before the assets mature.
No news in the healthy state is good news, whereas no news in recession is bad news.
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performance of securities backed by sub-prime mortgages and, more importantly, the failure
of the existing valuation models to predict their market prices, as revealed by BNP Paribas
in its August 9 announcement of suspension of NAV calculation for three of its funds invested
in sub-prime assets. Normal risks are familiar and can be discounted with confidence. The
realization that no one knew how to value these complex securities caused a fundamental
change in attitudes. The future looked bleak, absent the arrival of some new information
that would persuade investors that they could return to business as usual. In the event, such
information did not arrive in time (perhaps was strategically held back) so that investors
were not persuaded that they could carry on business as usual. In fact, many institutions,
especially money market mutual funds, were persuaded that they should not be in the
business of accepting commercial paper backed by these assets. The “freeze” was on. What
occurred was an “adverse dynamic,” to borrow Bernanke’s phrase, whereby a fundamental
change in information structures had reduced debt capacity through backward induction, in
the limiting case diminishing the debt capacity of the assets to zero.
It is important to acknowledge that we take the short-term nature of debt and fire
sales as given. That investment banks are (or used to be!) funded with rollover debt
and that debt capacity can be higher with short-term debt under some circumstances for
many underlying assets, are interesting facts in their own right. Indeed, there exist agency-
based explanations in the literature (for example, Diamond, 1989, 1991, 2004, Calomiris and
Kahn, 1991, and Diamond and Rajan, 2001a, 2001b) for the existence of short-term debt as
optimal financing in such settings. Our model presents a counter-example to the claim that
short-term debt maximizes debt capacity: when expectations are pessimistic, debt capacity
through short-term borrowing may in fact be arbitrarily small, suggesting that institutions
ought to arrange for this possibility by funding themselves also through sufficiently long-
term financing. Providing a micro (for example, an agency-theoretic) foundation for debt
maturity in a model where there is a switch between optimistic and pessimistic regimes is a
fruitful goal for future research, but one that is beyond the scope of this paper.
Our model assumes that when a lender needs to seize assets, these can only be sold to
another buyer who must also finance the assets with short-term debt. Further, the maximum
liquidation price the lender can obtain is proportional to, but smaller than, the new debt
capacity of assets. This assumption captures the idea of a “fire sale” that is rooted either in
the specificity of assets to current owners or in finance constraints for arbitrageurs or both.9
9There is a large body of literature in finance and economics justifying, verifying or employing fire
sales of assets during periods of industry- or economy-wide shocks. On the theoretical front, Williamson
(1988) and Shleifer and Vishny (1992) link this to the notion of specificity of assets, that is, the non-
transferability of assets across industries. On the empirical front, Pulvino (1998), Krugman (1998), Aguiar
and Gopinath (2005), Coval and Stafford (2006), Acharya, Bharath and Srinivasan (2007), and Acharya,
Shin and Yorulmazer (2007) have provided evidence of fire sales in real and financial markets in a variety of
settings. And, on an applied front, a large literature on financial crises (starting with Allen and Gale 1994,
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From the standpoint of our paper, these two features – short-term borrowing and fire sales
– imply that market freezes due to changes in expectations about the rollover risk are most
likely when the borrowing and/or lending horizon is short-term and the underlying assets
are “crowded” in the sense that most financial institutions are on one side of the market for
these assets. The first feature generates rollover risk and the second feature generates fire
sales in asset liquidations.
1.3 Applications
Our results can alternatively be stated in terms of the so-called “haircut” of an asset when it
is pledged for secured borrowing or used in a repo transaction. Measuring the haircut as one
minus the ratio of the debt capacity of an asset to its expected value (or the debt capacity for
buy-to-hold debt), our model shows that the haircut can be calculated simply, based on three
inputs: the credit risk of the asset (the hazard rate of default), the number of times the debt
must be rolled over before the asset matures, and the fire-sale discount incurred in the event
of liquidation of the assets by the lender. Under the optimistic information structure, the
haircut is zero whereas, under the pessimistic structure, the haircut is positive and reaches
100% in the limit as the rollover frequency becomes unbounded. More generally, when there
is the possibility of a switch between the optimistic and the pessimistic scenarios, the haircut
is positive but small in the optimistic case and can switch to a very large number in the
pessimistic case.10 Interestingly, while some of the collateralized debt obligations (CDO)
have had no secured borrowing capacity at all during the sub-prime crisis, equities – which
are in principle riskier assets – had only around a 20% haircut.11 This is consistent with our
model since, when there is rollover risk, it is not the underlying risk of asset’s cash flows but
its rollover risk which primarily affects its debt capacity.
Overall, our model and results apply to several institutional settings. The most natural
candidate, as we have discussed, is the practice of taking assets off-balance-sheet, putting
enough capital and liquidity/credit enhancements to make them “bankruptcy-remote” and
AAA-rated, and then borrowing short-term against these assets. Such structures, charac-
terized by a maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities, were prevalent in many forms
(“structured investment vehicles” or SIVs, “conduits,” and others) in the period leading up
to the sub-prime crisis (Crouhy, Jarrow and Turnbull, 2007).
1998) has employed fire sales as a key modeling device.
10Shin (2008), for example, documents based on data from Bloomberg, that the typical haircuts on trea-
suries, corporate bonds, AAA asset-backed securities, AAA residential mortgage-backed securities and AAA
jumbo prime mortgages are respectively, less than 0.5%, 5%, 3%, 2% and 5%, whereas, in March 2008, these
haircuts respectively rose to between 0.25% and 3%, 10%, 15%, 20% and 30%. See also the discussion in
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005) on widening of haircuts in stress times.
11See Box 1.5 from Chapter 1, Page 42 of IMF (2008).
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Yet another candidate is the commercial paper market accessed primarily by financial
institutions, but also by highly-rated industrial corporations, where rollover at short matu-
rities is a standard feature. Consider the balance-sheet of a financial institution (such as
that of Northern Rock or of the investment banks Bear Sterns and Lehman Brothers) where
the funding model inherently resembles that of a SIV, that is, long-term risky assets such as
mortgages are funded by short-term, asset-backed commercial paper. These markets experi-
enced severe stress during the sub-prime crisis and froze (100% haircut) for many days at a
stretch once the expectations about the quality of mortgage assets became pessimistic, even
though, prior to this period, they appeared to be the cheapest form of financing available
(near-zero haircut).
Overall, the sub-prime crisis of 2007 and 2008 illustrates our key assumptions: Assets
were funded with short-term rollover debt; once the crisis broke out, long-term financing was
difficult to obtain for any institution; and there have been substantial discounts in the sale
of assets in SIVs and conduits.12
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a general discrete-time
framework that contains the optimistic and pessimistic information structures as special
cases (subsections 2.3 and 2.4 respectively) show how to derive the debt capacity in each
case; subsection 2.6 extends this analysis to the general case in which the economy can switch
between optimistic and pessimistic regimes. A number of comparative static results for cases
in which there is a closed form solution for the debt capacity, including a continuous-time
model, are gathered together in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the merits of some potential
interventions to help unfreeze rollover markets. Section 5 discusses the related literature.
Section 6 concludes with some ideas for further work. Appendix I contains proofs. Appendix
II extends the discrete-time model to allow for more general information structures.
2 Model
In the introduction, we described two different information structures, a “pessimistic” one
and an “optimistic” one. In this section we develop a framework that nests the two cases of
optimistic and pessimistic expectations. There are two states, one of which can be identified
12See, for instance, “SIV restructuring: A ray of light for shadow banking,” Financial Times, June 18
2008 ; and “Creditors find little comfort in auction of SIV Portfolio assets,” Financial Times, July 18 2008,
which both report that net asset values due to asset fire sales have fallen below 50% of paid-in capital. As
the first article reports: “[W]hen defaults on US subprime mortgages rose last summer, ABCP investors
stopped buying [short-term ABCP] notes – creating a funding crisis at SIVs. . . . This situation prompted
deep concern about the risk of a looming firesale of assets. The prospect was deemed so alarming that the
US Treasury attempted to organize a so-called “super-SIV” last autumn, which was supposed to purchase
SIV assets.”
10
with the optimistic regime and the other with the pessimistic regime. The evolution of the
economy is governed by a stationary, finite, Markov chain that switches randomly between
the two regimes (Figure 4). The two structures described in the introduction can be obtained
as limiting cases.
— Figure 4 about here —
2.1 Time
Figure 5 illustrates the timeline.
— Figure 5 about here —
For the sake of illustration, we consider a SIV attempting to raise asset-backed finance.
The SIV is set up at date t = 0 with a collection of assets as collateral. The sponsoring bank’s
objective is to maximize the value of the assets transferred to the SIV. This is equivalent to
maximizing the amount of debt finance that can be raised by the SIV using the assets as
collateral since the sponsoring bank can extract the full amount as payment for the assets.
In a perfectly competitive asset market, the sponsoring bank will make zero profit after
expenses, because the price of the assets in equilibrium will be bid up until they equal the
amount of finance available, i.e., the debt capacity of the assets. So, in equilibrium, finding
the maximum debt capacity is equivalent to determining the market value of the assets.
The assets backing the SIV have a finite life (e.g., mortgages) and we normalize units
of time so that the assets mature at date t = 1. The SIV issues commercial paper with a
maturity denoted by 0 < τ < 1, which implies that the SIV must rollover its debt exactly
N times, where
N + 1 =
1
τ
.
The unit interval [0, 1] is divided into intervals of length τ by a series of dates denoted by tn
and defined by
tn = nτ, n = 0, 1, ..., N + 1,
where t0 is the date the SIV is set up, tn is the date of the n-th rollover (for n = 1, ..., N),
and tN+1 is the final date at which the assets mature and their terminal value is realized.
For the time being we treat the maturity of the commercial paper τ and hence the number
of rollovers as fixed. Later we will be interested to see what happens when the number of
rollovers needed to span the interval [0, 1] increases without bound.
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2.2 Information
There are two states denoted by s1 and s2, where s1 is the “pessimistic” state and s2 is the
“optimistic” state. Transitions between states occur at the dates tn and are governed by a
stationary transition probability matrix
A =
[
a11 a12
a21 a22
]
=
[
p 1− p
1− q q
]
,
where aij is the probability of a transition from state si at date tn to state sj at date tn+1.
We assume q > 1− p. If the economy is in state s1 at date tn, it remains in the same state
at date tn+1 with probability p and switches to state s2 at date tn+1 with probability 1− p.
So, in terms of the story we told in the introduction, p is the probability of no news (which
is in fact bad news here) and 1 − p is the probability of good news. Similarly, in state s2,
the probability of no news (which is in fact good news) is q and the probability of bad news
is 1− q.
The optimistic and the pessimistic information structures illustrated in Figures 2 and
3 are special cases of this more general structure. For example, the pessimistic structure
(Figure 3) is obtained by assuming that the initial state at date t0 is s1 and that state s2
is an absorbing state. This requires that q = 1 and 0 < p < 1. Similarly, we obtain the
optimist information structure (Figure 2) by assuming that the initial state is s2 and that
s1 is an absorbing state, that is, p = 1 and 0 < q < 1. We shall use these special cases to
illustrate the theory, but our main results hold for the more general regime switching model.
The terminal value of the asset is a random variable V˜ , which is defined by
V˜ =
{
0 if the state is s1 at the terminal date t = 1
V > 0 if the state is s2 at the terminal date t = 1.
For simplicity, we assume that the asset has a current yield of zero and the risk-free interest
rate is 0. The market is assumed to be risk neutral.
If the SIV is forced to default and liquidate the assets, we assume that the assets fetch a
fraction λ ∈ [0, 1] of the maximum amount of finance that could be raised by the SIV as a going
concern. It is important to note that the recovery rate λ is applied to the maximum debt
capacity rather than to the fundamental value of the assets. If the buyer of the assets were a
wealthy investor who could hold the assets until maturity, the fundamental value would be
the relevant benchmark and the investor might well be willing to pay some fraction of the
fundamental value, only demanding a discount to make sure that he does not mistakenly
overpay for the assets. What we are assuming here is that the buyer of the assets is another
financial institution that must also issue short term debt in order to finance the purchase.
Hence, the buyer is constrained by the same forces that determined the debt capacity in the
first place. While the debt capacity provides an upper bound on the purchase price, there
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is no reason to think that the assets will reach this value. In fact, we assume λ < 1 in what
follows.
2.3 Debt capacity in the optimistic structure
Our problem is to determine the maximum amount that can be borrowed by the SIV using
only the assets as collateral. We denote the maximum value of debt in state i at date tn
as Bin when the SIV is solvent. As a benchmark, we consider first the debt capacity in the
optimistic information structure, that is, the special case where p = 1 and 0 < q < 1. We can
do this by backward induction, beginning with the period before the asset matures. There
are two possible situations to consider. Either (i) bad news has arrived, in which case the
value of the asset is 0 for certain, or (ii) bad news has not yet arrived, in which case the
value of the asset remains uncertain.
Suppose that bad news has not yet arrived, that is, the economy is in state s2, at the
penultimate date tN and the SIV issues debt with a face value of D. If D > V , the SIV
defaults next period regardless of the value of the asset and the expected value of the debt
is
qλV + (1− q)× 0 = qλV.
On the other hand, if D ≤ V , then the SIV will only default in state s1 and the expected
value of the debt is
qD + (1− q)× 0 = qD.
Then the value of debt is given by the formula
max {qλV, qD} ,
which is maximized by setting D = V . If we let Bin denote the maximum debt that can be
raised in state si at date tn, then we have shown that B
2
N = qV , that is, the maximum debt
that can be raised at date tN in state s2 is qV .
Now let’s move back one period and assume again that good news has not arrived. If the
face value of the debt issued is D, the value of the debt in the ante-penultimate period is{
q (λqV ) + (1− q)× 0 if D > qV
qD + (1− q)× 0 if 0 ≤ D ≤ qV.
It is clear that the value of the debt issued is maximized by setting D = qV and hence, in
the notation introduced earlier, B2N−1 = q
2V .
Continuing in this way, we can calculate the maximum value of the debt that can be
raised against the SIV’s collateral at any date tn and find that it is given by the formula
B2n = q
N−n+1V.
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Now qN−n+1 is the probability that V˜ = V , conditional on reaching tn without receiving bad
news. So the debt capacity at any date tn is simply the fundamental value of the assets.
This could be considered the “normal” result, where there is no haircut in secured borrowing
the absence of risk aversion and asymmetric information.
2.4 Debt capacity in the pessimistic structure
Now consider pessimistic information structure (Figure 3) in which q = 1 and 0 < p < 1. At
any date, there are two possible situations to consider depending on the state the economy.
Either (i) good news has arrived, in which case the value of the asset is V for certain, or (ii)
good news has not yet arrived, in which case the value of the asset remains uncertain. Again,
we can analyze the debt capacity by backward induction, beginning with the penultimate
date tN .
Suppose that goods news has not yet arrived. In the penultimate period, the SIV issues
debt with a face value of D. If D > V , the SIV defaults next period regardless of the value
of the asset and the expected value of the debt is
(1− p)λV + p× 0 = (1− p)λV.
On the other hand, if D ≤ V , then the expected value of the debt is
(1− p)D + p× 0 = (1− p)D.
Then the value of debt is given by the formula
max {(1− p)λV, (1− p)D} ,
which is maximized by setting D = V . Then the maximum debt that can be raised is
(1− p)V or, in the notation introduced earlier, B1N = (1− p)V .
Now let’s move back one period and assume again that good news has not arrived. If the
face value is D, the value of the debt in the ante-penultimate period is
(1− p)λV + pλB1N if D > V
(1− p)D + pλB1N if B1N < D ≤ V
D if D ≤ B1N .
Noting that V > B1N , it is clear that the value of the debt is maximized by setting D = V
and the maximum value of the debt is B1N−1 = (1− p)V +pλ (1− p)V = (1 + pλ) (1− p)V .
Unlike in the optimistic structure, the debt capacity at date tN−1 is not equal to the funda-
mental value, which is (1− p2)V . The reason for the divergence is interesting. The value of
the asset is higher in state s2 than in state s1 but the market value of the debt will not reflect
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this higher asset value unless the face value of the debt is higher than the debt capacity in
state s1, i.e., D > B
1
N = (1− p)V . So in order to maximize the value of its debt, the SIV
has to choose a face value that will force it to default in state s1 and lose a fraction (1− λ) of
the asset’s value, thus ensuring that the market value of the debt is below the fundamental
value.
2.4.1 The general formula for the pessimistic case
Continuing in this way, we can calculate the maximum value of the debt that can be raised
against the SIVs collateral for any date tn. The general formula is proved by induction. We
want to show that debt capacity at any date tn is given by the formula
B1n =
(
N−n∑
i=0
piλi
)
(1− p)V. (1)
This formula agrees with the results obtained above, namely, B1N = (1− p)V and B1N−1 =
(1 + pλ) (1− p)V , so we have already proved that (1) holds for n equal to N and N − 1.
Now suppose as an induction hypothesis that (1) holds at tn and consider what happens
in the preceding period. Note first that the debt capacity B1n−1 must satisfy
B1n−1 = max
{
(1− p)V + pλB1n, B1n
}
,
depending on whether the face value of the debt is set equal to V or to B1n, and that
B1n−1 = (1− p)V + pλB1n (2)
if and only if
(1− p)V + pλB1n ≥ B1n
which is equivalent to
B1n ≤
(1− p)V
1− pλ
=
(
1 + pλ+ p2λ2 + · · · ) (1− p)V
=
( ∞∑
i=0
piλi
)
(1− p)V.
Our induction hypothesis guarantees that this inequality is satisfied and hence that (2) is
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satisfied. Then using (2) and the induction hypothesis (1), we calculate
B1n−1 = (1− p)V + (1− p)λB1n
= (1− p)V + pλ
(
N−n∑
i=0
piλi
)
(1− p)V
=
(
N−n+1∑
i=0
piλi
)
(1− p)V,
as required.
Thus, we have proved by induction that,
Lemma 1 For any date tn, regardless of the number of rollovers that have taken place, the
maximum amount of finance that can be raised is given by the formula (1).
2.4.2 Market freezes
We say that the market for short-term borrowing by the SIV is experiencing a “freeze” if
the debt capacity of the SIV goes to zero. To characterize a market freeze, we examine the
effect of the number of rollovers N on the maximum finance B1n that can be raised at each
date tn. There are various ways of interpreting the changes in the model that lead to an
increase in the number of rollovers. We could think of this as involving a shortening of the
maturity of the commercial paper (reducing the length of the time period). Alternatively, we
could think of this as involving an increase in the time horizon. Either way, it is convenient
simply to track the number of rollovers to maturity and treat N as the exogenous variable
in our comparative static analysis. There should, of course, be a ceteris paribus assumption
that the fundamental value of the asset remains constant as we vary N . The natural way to
achieve this is to assume that the time period τ between successive dates tn and tn+1 shrinks
while the probability of a switch between states remains constant per unit of time.
Let p′ be the credit risk of the asset, given by the equation p′ = pN+1. We wish to
evaluate the debt capacity at the initial date B10 , holding p
′ constant, as N → ∞ or, what
is the same, as τ → 0. Now,
B10 =
(
N∑
i=0
piλi
)
(1− p)V
≤ (1− p)V
∞∑
i=0
piλi
= (1− p)V 1
1− pλ
≤ 1
1− λ(1− p)V.
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Holding p′ = pN > 0 constant implies that p → 1 as N → ∞. Then the inequality above
implies that B10 → 0 as N → ∞. Thus, we have shown our main result, the existence of a
“market freeze”.
Proposition 2 Under the pessimistic information structure, the debt capacity of the asset
B10 tends to zero as the number of rollovers becomes unbounded, holding constant the credit
risk of the asset held to maturity, provided p′ > 0 and λ < 1.
What is striking about the result is that it holds for arbitrarily small credit risks, capturing
the scenario that Bear Stearns experienced during its failure in March 2008. A corollary of
this result is that, as credit risk increases, fewer debt rollovers are needed to make the debt
capacity of an asset fall below some arbitrary threshold.
2.4.3 Intuitive explanation of the market freeze
Since the result on market freeze is somewhat surprising, we provide an informal description
of why it arises.
It is clear that, as we approach the maturity date in state s1, the fundamental value of the
asset converges to zero. So the debt capacity, which is bounded above by the fundamental,
must also converge to zero as we approach the maturity date in state s1.
At earlier dates, the debt capacity in state s1 may be greater than zero, because of
the possibility of switching to state s2. This raises the important question of how different
factors, such as rollover risk and credit risk, limit the debt capacity when there is a substantial
amount of time left before the assets mature.
One key determinant of the debt capacity is the rate at which the debt is rolled over
relative to the arrival of good news, i.e., a switch to state s2. The faster the debt has to be
rolled over, other things being equal, the smaller the probability that good news will arrive
before the next rollover date. In other words, with high probability, there is no (good) news
before the next roll over date. Then the main determinant of current debt capacity in state
s1 is the future debt capacity in state s1.
Consider the relationship between the face value of the debt and its market value. In-
tuitively, a high face value increases the market value of the debt because of the possibility
that the optimistic state, s2, is realized; but the more likely outcome is that the economy
remains in the pessimistic state, s1, in which case the high face value leads to default and
liquidation. To be more precise, suppose that the debt capacity at the next rollover date is
B. If we issue debt with face value B, the market value of the debt is also B. If we issue
debt with a higher face value, we gain at most V − B if the state switches to s2 before the
next rollover date, but we lose the default cost (1− λ)B if there is no switch. The market
value of the debt increases if and only if
(1− p) (V −B)− p (1− λ)B ≥ 0
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or
B ≤ (1− p)V
1− pλ .
Since this inequality holds at each rollover date, it shows that the debt capacity, starting at
zero at the terminal date 1, can never rise above the right hand bound, no matter how many
periods are left before the maturity date. Since the expression on the right converges to zero
as the probability of good news, 1− p, converges to zero, we have the market freeze result.
2.5 Factors driving market freezes
Before we move on to the general case, it may be useful to review the various components
of the model to identify the key drivers of the market freeze phenomenon in our setup.
• Credit risk While some credit risk is necessary for the market freeze result, an arbi-
trarily small value of p′ > 0 is sufficient. The assumption of some (small) credit risk is
natural when one thinks of asset-backed commercial paper and non-government bond
repo transactions.
• Liquidation risk Similarly, as long as there is a positive liquidation cost 1 − λ > 0,
the market freeze result holds. Conversely, if there is zero liquidation cost, for example,
because the underlying asset is fully liquid and requires no asset-specific skills on the
part of the borrower, or there are enough alternative, efficient buyers who do not
require rollover financing, then regardless of credit risk, rollover risk and information
structure, the debt capacity of the asset is equal to the fundamental value of the asset
(set λ = 1 in formula 1).
• Rollover frequency Even under the pessimistic information structure, regardless of
the credit risk and the liquidation cost, the debt capacity of buy-to-hold debt is equal
to the fundamental value of the asset. Hence, rollover risk is critical to obtaining the
market freeze result.
• Information structure The information structure is also crucial for the market freeze
result. In the optimistic structure, the debt capacity is always equal to the fundamental
value, regardless of the other parameters of the model, whereas, in the pessimistic
structure, the debt capacity falls to zero as the number of rollovers increases without
bound, holding constant the credit risk p′.
We conclude that the critical features of the model are the necessity of frequent rollovers
and the information structure, specifically, the existence of the pessimistic state.
While an arbitrarily small liquidation cost is sufficient for the market freeze result, the
magnitude of 1 − λ is an important determinant of debt capacity for a given number of
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rollovers. We see from the formula in (1) that the debt capacity in the pessimistic state is
increasing in λ. A small value of λ is most likely where the likely acquirers of assets are all
on one side of the market. That is, when potential acquirers are likely to be hit by a common
shock or the underlying trade is “crowded”, then its liquidation will lead to fire sales. An
alternative interpretation is that a market freeze is likely in assets that are complex and
where owners of assets have expertise or management skills which are not transferable when
lenders try to seize and liquidate the asset (Williamson, 1988, Shleifer and Vishny, 1992). A
fitting example here might be mortgage-backed securities since prepayment and default risk
of households on home loans are borne by the financial sector as a whole, but the risk gets
repackaged also within the financial sector through these securities. Hence, a common shock
to the financial sector would render this asset class relatively illiquid, as witnessed briefly
during the Long Term Capital Management crisis of 1998 and more extensively during the
sub-prime crisis of 2007-08.
The credit risk has a direct impact on the debt capacity because it determines the fun-
damental value of the asset. But it also has an indirect effect that reduces debt capacity
relative to the fundamental value. In other words, the higher the credit risk, the higher the
“haircut,” as we show formally in Section 3.
2.6 Debt capacity in the general case
We now show that the result on market freezes derived under the pessimistic information
structure of Figure 3 can also be derived under the more general information structure of
Figure 4.
In the general case, the debt capacities in the two states, s1 and s2, are simultaneously
determined and this prevents us from obtaining a closed form expression for the debt capacity.
As in the special cases with absorbing states, we calculate the maximum value of the debt
that can be issued using the assets as collateral by backward induction, beginning with the
period before the asset matures. The arguments are similar to those used in the special cases
discussed above and are relegated to the appendix. The information we need is contained in
the following proposition.
Proposition 3 At the penultimate date tN , the borrowing capacity is (1− p)V in state s1
and qV in state s2. For all dates tn < tN , the borrowing capacities in state s1 and state s2
are denoted by B1n and B
2
n, respectively, and defined recursively by the equations
B1n = max
{
B1n+1, pλB
1
n+1 + (1− p)B2n+1
}
B2n = max
{
B1n+1, (1− q)λB1n+1 + qB2n+1
}
.
The presence of the max operator in these expressions is inconvenient, but we can show
that it is often not binding. Let us first note the following facts.
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Lemma 4 Debt capacity in the pessimistic state (B1n) and the optimistic state (B
2
n) satisfies
the following properties:
1. For each n = 0, 1, ..., N , B2n > B
1
n.
2. B2n−1 < B
2
n for every n = 1, ..., N .
In words, Lemma 4 says that (1) the debt capacity is always higher in the optimistic state
s2 than in the pessimistic state s1, and (2) the debt capacity in the optimistic state s2 is a
strictly increasing function of the date tn. The first result is intuitive. In the penultimate
state, the probability that V˜ = V is higher in state s2 than in state s1 (because q > 1− p).
This immediately tells us that debt capacity is higher in state s2 than in state s1 at date tN .
Then, assuming that the result holds for some date tn, we can show that it holds for date
tn−1 using the formulae in Proposition 3. The second result is explained by the fact that the
probability that V˜ = V , conditional on being in state s2, increases as one gets closer to the
horizon.
The evolution of debt capacity in the pessimistic state s1 follows an interesting pattern.
For sufficiently large dates tn the debt capacity must be declining, but there may also be an
initial period during which it is constant, as the following result shows.
Proposition 5 Suppose that q + pλ > 1. Then, there exists a critical value n∗ < N such
that B1n > B
1
n+1 for every n ≥ n∗ and B1n = B1n+1 for every n < n∗.
If the likelihood of good news in the pessimistic state is sufficiently small relative to that
in the optimistic state (pλ > 1 − q), then debt capacity in the pessimistic state (weakly)
decreases as the asset matures, i.e., as tn increases. Note that this assumption will always
be satisfied if the time between rollover dates is sufficiently small.
2.7 Limiting value of debt capacity as τ → 0
We want to explore the effect of increasing the number of roll overs, holding constant the
total probability of ending up in the bad state. The most elegant way of doing this is to
reduce the length of the period, τ , holding constant the probability of switching states per
unit of time. In what follows, we denote the debt capacity in state si by B
i
n (τ) to make
clear the dependence on τ and let p (τ) = e−ατ and q (τ) = e−βτ for fixed α > 0 and β > 0.
Consider the behavior of B1n (τ) as τ → 0. Since B1n (τ) is non-increasing in n for fixed
τ it is sufficient to consider what happens to the debt capacity B10 (τ) at the time of the
original debt issue. We obtain the following formal proposition.
Proposition 6 As the period length τ → 0, B10 (τ)→ 0.
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In other words, debt capacity in the pessimistic state goes to zero in the limit as number of
rollover become unbounded, even when there is some chance of switching from the pessimistic
state to the optimistic state. In this sense, the market freeze associated with the pessimistic
state is especially perverse.
By contrast, when we consider the behavior of B2n (τ), the debt capacity in the optimistic
state, we obtain that in this case, debt capacity is bounded from below by a finite quantity
even as the number of rollovers becomes unbounded. In particular, this is true in spite of
the fact that we hold constant the probability of ending up in the good state s2.
Proposition 7
1. For any n and τ , B2n (τ) ≥ q (τ)N−n+1 V , where τ = 1N+1 .
2. As τ → 0 and nτ → t ∈ (0, 1), B2n (τ) ≥ e−β(1−t) V .
3. If nτ → t ∈ (0, 1) as the period length τ → 0, then B2n (τ)→ e−β(1−t)V as τ → 0.
We want to find out the effect of letting the number of rollovers increase holding every-
thing else constant. In other words, we want to hold constant the flow of information about
the final state while increasing the relative speed at which debt is rolled over. To make sure
that the information flow is kept constant, we need to examine the transition probabilities
between fixed points in time, rather than between successive periods. The general formula
for the k-step transition probability matrix is given by
P k =
[
p
(k)
11 p
(k)
12
p
(k)
21 p
(k)
22
]
=
1
2− (p+ q)
[
1− q 1− p
1− q 1− p
]
+
(q + p− 1)k
2− (p+ q)
[
1− p p− 1
q − 1 1− q
]
where p
(k)
ij is the probability of a transition from si to sj in k steps. The derivation can be
found in a standard reference such as Feller (1968). The first term in the expression is the
ergodic distribution. To see this, simply note that, if q and p are both strictly less than 1,
then (q + p− 1)k → 0 as k →∞ and
lim
k→∞
P k =
1
2− (p+ q)
[
1− q 1− p
1− q 1− p
]
.
In other words, the probability of being in either state is independent of the initial distribu-
tion for large n.
This is not the ceteris paribus exercise we want to carry out, however, since here we have
held p and q fixed while varying k, which implies that more and more information is accruing
during the interval [0, 1]. Instead, we want to explore the effect of increasing the number of
roll overs, holding constant the credit risk, that is, the probability of ending up in state s1.
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The most elegant way of doing this is to reduce the length of the period, holding constant the
probability of switching states per unit of time. So let p = e−ατ and q = e−βτ , where τ is the
period length. Then as τ → 0, we can approximate p and q by 1−ατ and 1−βτ , respectively.
Substituting these into the N + 1 step transition probability matrix PN+1 representing the
transition probabilities between date 0 and date 1 and setting τ = 1
N+1
, we obtain
Proposition 8 Let p
(∞)
ij denote the probability of a transition from state si at time t = 0 to
state sj at time t = 1 in the limit as τ → 0 and let P∞ =
[
p
(∞)
ij
]
2×2
. Then
P∞ = lim
τ→0
P
1
τ =
1
(α + β)
[
β α
β α
]
+
e−α−β
(α + β)
[
α −α
−β β
]
.
Let κ = α + β and α = γκ. Then we can rewrite the expression above as
P∞ =
[
1− γ γ
1− γ γ
]
+ e−κ
[
γ −γ
− (1− γ) 1− γ
]
.
The first term is the ergodic distribution. We can think of γ as measuring the ratio of α to
β, which determines the probability of the two states in the ergodic distribution, and κ as
measuring the amount of information that arrives over the period [0, 1]. Holding κ and γ
constant ensures the ceteris paribus assumption is satisfied.
The parameters κ and γ have a natural interpretation in terms of the credit risk faced
by the lenders in states s1 and s2, respectively. The probability of ending up in state s1 is
1 − γ (1− e−κ) conditional on being in state s1 at t0 and it is (1− γ) (1− e−κ) conditional
on being in state s2 at t0. The difference in these probabilties is
1− γ (1− e−κ)− (1− γ) (1− e−κ) = e−κ.
Thus, e−κ measures the difference in credit risk in states s1 and s2 at the initial date. The
same is true of the probabilities of ending up in state s2 after starting in state s1 or state s2,
respectively. Thus, by assuming κ = α + β large enough, we can ensure that the transition
probabilities from different initial states are as close as we like. Although this is not a
particularly plausible case, it demonstrates that the results in Propositions 6 and 7 are not
driven by different probabilities of ending up in the bad state.
3 Comparative statics
Although the regime switching model allows us to prove a quite general result about market
freezes, it is convenient to have closed form solutions in order to derive comparative static
properties. For this purpose, we revert to the special case of the pessimistic structure, in
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which q = 1 and the good state s2 becomes an absorbing state. Our first exercise is to use
the formula derived in Section 2.4.1 to derive the impact of the parameters on the so-called
“haircut” when an asset is used as collateral.
3.1 A formula for haircuts
Results on debt capacity can be stated in terms of the equivalent haircut of an asset. In
secured borrowing or repo transactions, the haircut on an asset is the proportion of (some
notion of) its fundamental value that the investor cannot borrow against. We define the
fundament value of the asset for as the debt capacity when the debt is held to maturity, that
is, (1− p′)V . Recall that p′ is the credit risk of the asset, given by the equation p′ = pN+1.
Thus, we can measure the haircut H0 in the model as one minus the ratio of B
1
0 to (1−p′)V .
The haircut is then given by the formula:
H0 = 1− 1− p
1− p′
(
N∑
i=0
piλi
)
. (3)
The haircut can thus be calculated simply based on three inputs:
1. the credit risk of the asset, p′;
2. the number N of debt rollovers, or its rollover risk; and,
3. the recovery rate λ or, equivalently, the fire-sale discount (1 − λ) incurred in case of
liquidation of the asset by a lender.
Then, it follows from Lemma 1 and Proposition 6 that
Corollary 9 As long as p′ > 0 and λ < 1, the haircut of an asset is strictly positive and
tends to 100% as its rollover risk N becomes unbounded.
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005) and Shin (2008) discuss in detail the sharp widening of
haircuts in stress times, even for relatively high quality assets such as AAA-rated asset pools.
The table from Shin (2008) is included in footnote 10. Our model provides an explanation
for why stress times – when credit risk, rollover risk and liquidation risk rise – are associated
with such large swings in haircuts. Figures 6a and 6b provide some illustrative calibrations
to generate haircuts of the magnitude described by Shin (2008), summarized in footnote 10.
— Figures 6a, 6b about here —
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Even more strikingly, Box 1.5 from Chapter 1 of IMF’s Global Stability Report (2008)
shows that while some of the collateralized debt obligations (CDO) have had no secured
borrowing capacity at all during the sub-prime crisis, equities and high-yield bonds – which
are in principle riskier assets – had only around 20% and 25 to 40% haircuts, respectively.
This is also consistent with our model since, whenever there is rollover risk, it is not the
underlying risk of an asset’s cash flows but its liquidation risk that primarily determines the
debt capacity.
Finally, the fact that haircut tends to 100% as the rollover frequency increases without
bound provides a potential explanation for why Bear Stearns experienced a complete inability
in March 2008 to obtain any overnight rollover financing against its even high quality assets.
3.2 A continuous-time model
We can obtain more tractable, closed-form solutions if we assume that time is continuous and
that both information and rollover dates arrive according to independent Poisson processes.
This allows us to consider not only variations in the relative rates of information arrival and
rollovers, but also uncertainty about the number of rollovers that may be necessary before
the underlying asset matures. Below, we provide a closed-form solution for the pessimistic
information structure.
Let α denote the arrival rate of good news (i.e., a switch from state s1 to the absorbing
state s2) and let ρ denote the arrival rate of the rollover date. For simplicity, we assume
that the information arrival process is independent of the rollover process (the correlated
case can be analyzed analogously). Then the probability that a rollover and an information
event occur in the same period of length ∆t is simply the product of the two probabilities
α∆t and ρ∆t, i.e.,
(α∆t) (ρ∆t) = αρ (∆t)2 = o (∆t) .
Let B (t) denote the maximum amount of debt that can be raised at time t assuming that
good news has not yet arrived and that the SIV is solvent.13 Then B (t) must satisfy the
difference equation
B (t) = (1− α∆t− ρ∆t)B (t+ ∆t) + α∆tV + ρ∆tλB (t+ ∆t) + o (∆t) . (4)
With probability (1− α∆t− ρ∆t), no information arrives, the debt is not re-financed in the
period (t, t+ ∆t) and the pledgeable value of the asset is B (t+ ∆t). With probability α∆t,
good news arrives and the pledgeable value is V . And with probability ρ∆t it is necessary
to re-finance the debt and, assuming the face value of the debt is V > B (t+ ∆t), the asset
has to be sold at a fire sale and realizes a sale price of λB (t+ ∆t).
13We have dropped the superscript 1 as we are only focusing on the pessimistic information structure here
(Figure 3).
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Taking limits as ∆t→ 0, we obtain the differential equation
B′ (t) = −αV + (α + ρ (1− λ))B (t) .
Solving this differential equation using standard methods yields
Lemma 10 The debt capacity of the asset at time t is denoted by B (t) and defined by
B (t) =
αV
α + ρ (1− λ)
(
1− e(α+ρ(1−λ))(t−1)) . (5)
The maximum finance that can be raised at the initial date is obtained by setting t = 0
in the formula above. Recall that the probability that good news does not arrive in the
interval [0, 1], that is, the probability that the value of the asset is 0, is e−α. Hence, the
fundamental value of the asset is (1− e−α)V . Thus, the haircut at date 0 can be denoted
by H (0) and defined by
H(0) = 1− B(0)
(1− e−α)V
= 1− α
(
1− e−(α+ρ(1−λ)))
[α + ρ (1− λ)] (1− e−α) .
The following proposition provides comparative statics results on the debt capacity and
the haircut.
Proposition 11 Using the formula for the haircut H (0) obtained above, we can derive the
following comparative statics results:
(i) The debt capacity B(0) is decreasing in the rollover frequency, ρ, and the liquidation cost,
(1− λ), and is increasing in α.
(ii) The haircut H(0) is increasing in the rollover frequency, ρ, and the liquidation cost,
(1− λ), and is decreasing in α.
Figure 7 illustrates the results from the above proposition. In particular, we vary ρ to
get a sense of the role of the relative speeds of information arrival and re-financing on debt
capacity (Figure 7a) and haircut (Figure 7b). We choose values of α such that the asset’s
credit risk, e−α, takes values 0.001, 0.01 and 0.1,14, we normalize V = 1, and we use λ = 0.7
to capture the liquidation cost.
— Figures 7a, 7b about here —
14The corresponding α-values are 6.9078, 4.6052, and 2.3026, respectively.
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Note that, as ρ approaches 0, the debt capacity of the asset approaches its fundamental
value, and, in turn, the required haircut approaches 0, for all values of the credit risk.
Furthermore, the rollover risk (captured by ρ) and the credit risk (captured by α) act as
substitutes, that is, for lower levels of credit risk, higher levels of rollover risk are needed to
get the same levels of debt capacity and haircut. Since ρ is equal to the expected number
of rollovers in the unit interval, we can see that there is a substantial haircut even when the
number of rollovers is reasonably small and the level of credit risk is extremely small.
4 Policy implications
It is tempting to ask the question: Can a regulator do something to unfreeze the market?
Note that our model is partial equilibrium. It shows how the nature of information arrival
affects rollover debt capacity. It does not endogenize either the short-term nature of debt or
the liquidation cost in case of default. Hence, any policy implications we draw below must
also be viewed as partial equilibrium ones, narrowly focused at alleviating the market freeze
without attention to any other related efficiency issues or unintended consequences.
We discuss two possible policy interventions.
4.1 Improving the liquidation value of assets
Recall that in our model, debt capacity shrinks with rollovers under the pessimistic informa-
tion structure since in case of default, asset must be sold to another player also constrained
to borrow using rollover debt. If the maturity of borrowing of alternative buyers of assets
lengthens, then the haircut in borrowing would fall and so would liquidation costs. During
a systemic crisis, however, there are few private agents with long-term horizons because the
ultimate providers of finance - the households - themselves become short-term focused. A
regulator such as the Central Bank or the Treasury can, in principle, directly attempt to
improve the liquidation value (λ) of affected assets by lending against the asset as a collateral
based on its full buy-and-hold value.
This argument could provide a rationale for the wide variety of lending facilities created
by the Federal Reserve during the sub-prime crisis to lend to a large number of borrowers,
against a wide variety of collateral, at minimal (if any) haircut.15 In practice, such facilities
15For example, in addition to the traditional tools the Fed uses to implement monetary policy (e.g.,
Open Market Operations, Discount Window, and Securities Lending program), five new programs were
implemented during August 2007 to March 2008: 1) Term Discount Window Program (announced 8/17/2007)
- extended the length of discount window loans available to institutions eligible for primary credit from
overnight to a maximum of 90 days; 2) Term Auction Facility (TAF) (announced 12/12/2007) - provides
funds to primary credit eligible institutions through an auction for a term of 28 days; 3) Single-Tranche OMO
(Open Market Operations) Program (announced 3/7/2008) - allows primary dealers to secure funds for a
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had a temporary effect on most markets they intervened in, but they appear to have failed
to resolve the market freezes completely. While the reason behind this failure remains an
important puzzle, one possible explanation could be the following. Our model suggests that
for haircuts to vanish or become minimal, at each rollover date until maturity of the asset,
the lender should anticipate guaranteed regulatory lending against the assets to potential
buyers. The Federal Reserve facilities were, however, newly introduced and their horizon of
provision was announced as short-term, with discretionary extension in future. The residual
uncertainty left by such discretion may have been a factor that prevented a complete thawing
of asset-backed debt markets in spite of substantial short-term interventions.
4.2 Requiring higher “capital” in asset-backed finance
An alternative policy implication of our model is that while short-term rollover debt entails
little financing cost (if any) in good times, its availability can dry up suddenly when unex-
pected or hitherto unexperienced events happen. The excessive reliance on rollover finance
thus exposes borrowers (such as SIV’s and conduits) to low likelihood but high magnitude
funding risk. It may be more prudent for such borrowers to account for such funding risk and
complement rollover debt in their capital structure with forms of capital such as long-term
debt and equity capital that face lower rollover risk.
Of course, the very information frictions that cause a switch in investors’ expectations
from pessimistic to optimistic ones may also preclude availability of such long-term finance
once a crisis erupts. Hence, the reduced reliance on rollover debt must be a part of prudential
capital structure choice in good times rather than being undertaken during bad times. While
financial institutions should have privately recognized the risks of rollover finance, it cannot
be ruled out that such risks were not yet fully understood. Going forward, a prudential
regulator could play the role of a watchdog, looking out for excessive reliance on rollover
finance, and encouraging in such cases a greater reliance on long-term capital, through moral
suasion or rule-based policies. Since long-term capital may be infeasible beyond a point for
opaque, off-balance-sheet structures such as SIV’s and conduits, such regulatory push will
most likely reduce their incidence in the first place.
term of 28 days. These operations are intended to augment the single day repurchase agreements (repos)
that are typically conducted; 4) Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) (announced 3/11/2008) - allows
primary dealers to pledge a broader range of collateral than is accepted with the Securities Lending program,
and also to borrow for a longer term — 28 days versus overnight; and, 5) Primary Dealer Credit Facility
(PDCF) (announced 3/16/2008) - is an overnight loan facility that provides funds directly to primary dealers
in exchange for a range of eligible collateral.
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5 Related literature
Our paper is related to the literature on haircuts, freezes and runs in financial markets.
Rosenthal and Wang (1993) use a model where owners occasionally need to sell their assets
for exogenous liquidity reasons through auctions with private information. Because of the
auction format, sellers may not be able to extract the full value of the asset and this liquida-
tion cost gets built into the market price of the asset, making the market price systematically
lower than the fundamental value. In our model, the source of the haircut is not the private
information of potential buyers. Furthermore, we show that under the optimistic information
structure, even with forced sales (roll over in our case), the asset can generate its full value.
And our regime switching model provides a more general analysis to flesh out the specific
information structures (pessimistic case) that lead to haircuts and market freezes.
He and Xiong (2009) consider a model of dynamic bank runs in which bank creditors have
supplied debt maturing at differing maturities and each creditor faces the risk at the time of
rolling over that fundamentals may deteriorate before remaining debt matures causing a fire
sale of assets. In their model, volatility of fundamentals plays a key role in driving the runs
even when the average value of fundamentals has not been affected. Our model of freeze or
“run” of short-term debt is complementary to theirs, and somewhat different in the sense
that both average value and uncertainty about fundamentals are held constant in our model,
but it is the nature of revelation of uncertainty over time – whether good news arrives early
or bad news arrives early – that determines whether there is rollover risk in short-term debt
or not.
Huang and Ratnovski (2008) model the behavior of short-term wholesale financiers who
prefer to rely on noisy public signals such as market prices and credit ratings, rather then
producing costly information about the institutions they lend to. Hence, wholesale financiers
run on other institutions based on imprecise public signals, triggering potentially inefficient
runs. While their model is about runs in the wholesale market as is ours, their main focus is
to challenge the peer-monitoring role of wholesale financiers, whereas our main focus is the
role of rollover and liquidation risk in generating such runs.
An alternative modelling device to generate market freezes is to employ the notion of
Knightian uncertainty (see Knight, 1921) and agents’ overcautious behavior towards such
uncertainty. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) build a model where agents become extremely
cautious and consider the worst-case among the possible outcomes, that is, agents are uncer-
tainty averse and use maxmin strategies when faced with Knightian uncertainty. Dow and
Werlang (1992) apply the framework of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) to the optimal portfolio
choice problem and show that there is an interval of prices within which uncertainty-averse
agents neither buy nor sell the asset. Routledge and Zin (2004) and Easley and O’Hara
(2005, 2008) use Knightian uncertainty and agents that use maxmin strategies to generate
widening bid-ask spreads and freeze in financial markets. Caballero and Krishnamurthy
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(2007) also use the framework of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) to develop a model of flight
to quality during financial crises: During periods of increased Knightian uncertainty, agents
refrain from making risky investments and hoard liquidity, leading to flight to quality and
freeze in markets for risky assets.
As opposed to these models, in our model agents maximize their expected utility and
the main source of the market freeze is rollover and liquidation risk which become relevant
when the rate of arrival of good news is slower than the rate at which debt is being rolled
over. While both types of models can generate market freezes, we believe our model, by
emphasizing the rollover and liquidation risk, better captures important features of the
recent crisis where the market for rollover debt completely froze while equities - typically
considered to be more risky - continued to trade with haircuts of only 20%.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have attempted to provide a simple information-theoretic model for freezes
in the market for secured borrowing against finitely lived assets. The key ingredients of
our model were rollover risk, liquidation risk, and switch in investors’ expectations from
optimistic to pessimistic, that is, for the waiting-for-good-news type. Such a switch was
shown critical to obtaining the result on market freezes. This potentially explains why in
response to events not witnessed before by market participants (such as the Long Term
Capital Management episode or the sub-prime crisis), markets for rolling over short-term
asset-backed debt experience a sudden drying-up.
In future work, it would be interesting to embed an agency-theoretic role for short-term
debt, which we assumed as given, and see how the desirability of such rollover finance is
affected when information problems can lead to complete freeze in its availability. While we
took the pattern of release of information about the underlying asset as either ordained by
nature or determined by investors’ expectations, it seems worthwhile to reflect on its deeper
foundations, and thereby assess whether a strategic disclosure of information by agents in
charge of the asset can alleviate (or aggravate) the problem of freezes to some extent.
Appendix I: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3: At date tN , we are either in state s1 or in state s2. Suppose
the SIV is in state s1 and issues debt with a face value of D. By the usual argument, we
can show that it is never optimal to choose D > V and, if D ≤ V the the value of debt
is (1− p)D, which is maximized by setting D = V . Let B1N = (1− p)V denote the debt
capacity at date tN in state s1.
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Similarly, in state s2 it is never optimal to choose D > V and, if D ≤ V , the value of
the debt is qD, which is maximized by setting D = V . Let B2N = qV denote the borrowing
capacity at date tN in state s2.
Now let B1n and B
2
n be the borrowing capacities in states s1 and s2, respectively, when
at date tn, in the period when the n-th roll over occurs. If D is the face value of the debt
issued at date tn−1, then the value of the debt in state s1 is
pλB1n + (1− p)λB2n if D > B2n
pλB1n + (1− p)D if B1n < D ≤ B2n
D if D ≤ B1n.
Clearly, D > B2n is never optimal, so we choose between D = B
1
n and D = B
2
n and the
borrowing capacity is
B1n−1 = max
{
B1,n, pλB
1
n + (1− p)B2n
}
Similarly, in state s2, the value of the debt is
(1− q)λB1n + qλB2n if D > B2n
(1− q)λB1n + qD if B1n < D ≤ B2n
D if D ≤ B1n.
Again, D > B2n is never optimal, the choice is between D = B
1
n and D = B
2
n and the
borrowing capacity is
B2n = max
{
B1n, (1− q)λB1n + qB2n
}
.
Proof of Lemma 4:
1. This is certainly true for n = N and assuming it is true for n it follows that
B2n−1 = max
{
B1n, (1− q)λB1n + qB2n
}
≥ max{B1n, pλB1n + (1− p)B2n} = B1n−1
since q > 1− p and, by hypothesis, B2n > B1n. ♦
2. This follows from the fact that B2n > B
1
n and hence
B2n−1 = max
{
B1n, (1− q)λB1n + qB2n
}
< B2n.
This proves the stated claim. ♦
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Proof of Proposition 5: Certainly, for n = N − 1 we have
B1N−1 = max
{
B1N , pλB
1
N + (1− p)B2N
}
= max {(1− p)V, pλ (1− p)V + (1− p) qV } .
Then B1N−1 > B
1
N if and only if
q + pλ > 1,
which we assumed to hold. Let n∗ denote the smallest value of n such that B1n > B
1
n+1 for
all n ≥ n∗. Then for n = n∗, we have B1n−1 = B1n and
B1n−2 = max
{
B1n−1, pλB
1
n−1 + (1− p)B2n−1
}
≤ max{B1n, pλB1n + (1− p)B2n}
= B1n−1,
since B1n−1 = B
1
n and B
2
n > B
2
n−1.
But the same argument could be extended indefinitely, since it only depends on the
assumption that B1n−1 = B
1
n and B
2
n > B
2
n−1. This completes the proof. ♦
Proof of Proposition 6: We consider two cases in turn. Suppose first that n∗ (τ) >> 0 for
infinitely many values of τ → 0. For fixed τ , we know that B1n (τ) ≤ B1n∗ (τ) for any n ≤ N .
From the definition of n∗ (τ),
0 = B1n∗+1 (τ)−B1n∗ (τ)
= (1− p (τ))B2n∗ (τ) + p (τ)λB1n∗ (τ)−B1n∗ (τ)
= (1− p (τ))B2n∗ (τ)− (1− p (τ)λ)B1n∗ (τ)
=
(
1− e−ατ)B2n∗ (τ)− (1− e−ατλ)B1n∗ (τ) .
Then
B1n∗ (τ) ≤
(1− e−ατ )
(1− e−ατλ)B
2
n∗ (τ) .
Since the right hand side is bounded and e−ατ → 1 as τ → 0, we see that B1n∗ (τ) → 0 as
τ → 0, which means that B10 (τ)→ 0 as τ → 0.
Now suppose that n∗(τ) = 0 and B10 (τ) >> B
1
1 (τ) for infinitely many values of τ → 0.
Then
B10 (τ) = p (τ)λB
1
1 (τ) + (1− p (τ))B21 (τ)
≤ p (τ)λB10 (τ) + (1− p (τ))B21 (τ)
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which implies
B10 (τ) ≤
1− p (τ)
1− p (τ)λB
2
1 (τ)
=
1− e−ατ
1− e−ατλB
2
1 (τ) .
Since B21 (τ) is bounded and e
−ατ → 1, as τ → 0, we see that B10 (τ)→ 0 as τ → 0. ♦
Proof of Proposition 7:
1. For each n,
B2n (τ) = max
{
B1n+1 (τ) , q (τ)B
2
n+1 (τ) + (1− q (τ))λB1n+1
}
≥ q (τ)B2n+1 (τ)
= q (τ) max
{
B1n+2 (τ) , q (τ)B
2
n+2 (τ) + (1− q (τ))λB1n+2
}
≥ q (τ)2B2n+2 (τ)
· · ·
= q (τ)N−nB2N (τ) = q (τ)
N−n+1 V.
This proves the stated claim. ♦
2. From the preceding result,
B2n (τ) ≥ q (τ)N−n+1 V
=
(
e−βτ
)N−n+1
V
=
(
e−βτ
) 1−nτ
τ V
= e−β(1−nτ)V.
Then
lim
τ→0
e−β(1−nτ) = e−β(1−t)
follows from the fact that nτ → t as τ → 0. ♦
3. For fixed τ ,
B2n (τ) = q (τ)B
2
n+1 (τ) + (1− q (τ))λB1n+1
= q (τ)2B2n+2 + (1− q (τ))λB1n+1 + q (τ) (1− q (τ))λB1n+2
= q (τ)N−n+1 V +
N−n∑
i=1
(1− q (τ))λq (τ)i−1B1n+i (τ)
≤ q (τ)N−n+1 V +
N−n∑
i=1
(1− q (τ))λq (τ)i−1 max
i
B1n+i (τ)
= q (τ)N−n+1 V + λ
(
1− q (τ)N−n
)
max
i
B1n+i (τ) .
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Now let N + 1 = 1
τ
and τ → 0. As max
i
B1n+i (τ) converges to zero and q (τ)
N converges
to e−β(1−t), the left hand side converges to e−β(1−t)V . ♦
Proof of Proposition 8:
Substituting the expressions for p and q into PN+1 and setting τ = 1
N+1
gives us
P
1
τ =
1
(α + β) τ
[
βτ ατ
βτ ατ
]
+
(1− (α + β) τ) 1τ
(α + β) τ
[
ατ −ατ
−βτ βτ
]
=
1
(α + β)
[
β α
β α
]
+
(1− (α + β) τ) 1τ
(α + β)
[
α −α
−β β
]
.
Now
lim
τ→0
(1− (α + β) τ) 1τ = e−α−β
so
P∞ = lim
τ→0
P
1
τ =
1
(α + β)
[
β α
β α
]
+
e−α−β
(α + β)
[
α −α
−β β
]
.
Proof of Corollary 9: From Proposition 6, when p′ > 0 and λ < 1, B10 < (1 − p′)V for
n > 1, and B10 → 0 as n → ∞. In turn, the haircut H0 is always positive under these
conditions and goes to 100% as number of rollovers become unbounded. ♦
Proof of Lemma 10: Consider the difference equation (4). To see that it is optimal to
set the face value of the debt equal to V , consider the effect of choosing D < V as the face
value. Clearly, there is no point choosing D > B (t+ ∆t) or D < B(t + ∆t) so consider
D = B (t+ ∆t) for some period ∆t. Then the value of the debt with face value D is
(1− α∆t− ρ∆t)B (t+ ∆t) + α∆tB (t+ ∆t) + ρ∆tB (t+ ∆t) + o (∆t) =
B (t) + α∆t (B (t+ ∆t)− V ) + (1− λ) ρ∆tB (t+ ∆t) + o (∆t) .
Now
α (B (t+ ∆t)− V ) + (1− λ) ρB (t+ ∆t) + o (∆t)
∆t
< 0
for ∆t sufficiently small if
α
(
1− V
B (t+ ∆t)
)
+ ρ (1− λ) < 0. (6)
We assume this condition is satisfied for the time being and check it later.
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Re-arranging the terms of (4), we obtain
B (t+ ∆t)−B (t)
∆t
= −αV + (α + ρ (1− λ))B (t+ ∆t) + o (∆t)
∆t
.
Taking limits as ∆t→ 0, we obtain the differential equation
B′ (t) = −αV + (α + ρ (1− λ))B (t) .
This can be solved to yield a general solution of the form
B (t) =
αV
α + ρ (1− λ) + Ce
(α+ρ(1−λ))t
where C is an undetermined coefficient. Setting t = 1 and using the boundary condition
B (1) = 0, we get
0 =
αV
(α + ρ (1− λ)) + Ce
(α+ρ(1−λ))
or
C = − αV
(α + ρ (1− λ))e
−(α+ρ(1−λ)).
Then the solution is as given in equation (5).
It is clear that B (0) > B (t) for any t > 0, so in order to confirm condition (6) it is
sufficient to show that it holds for t = 0. Then
α
(
1− V
B (0)
)
+ (1− λ) = α
(
1− α + ρ (1− λ)
α (1− e−(α+ρ(1−λ)))
)
+ ρ (1− λ) < 0,
as required. ♦
Proof of Corollary 11:
(i) We already showed that
B (0) =
αV
α + ρ (1− λ)
(
1− e−(α+ρ(1−λ))) .
Let x = α + ρ (1− λ) so that dx
dρ
> 0, dx
d(1−λ) > 0, and
B(0)
αV
= 1
x
(1− e−x) . Hence,
sign
(
∂B(0)
∂ρ
)
= sign
(
∂B(0)
∂(1−λ)
)
= sign
(
∂(B(0)αV )
∂x
)
. We can show that
∂
(
B(0)
αV
)
∂x
= − 1
x2
(
1− e−x)+ 1
x
e−x =
1
x2
(
(1 + x)e−x − 1) .
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Let f(x) = (1 + x)e−x − 1. Note that f(0) = 0 and f ′(x) = −xe−x < 0 for x > 0. Hence,
we obtain ∂B(0)
∂ρ
< 0 and ∂B(0)
∂(1−λ) < 0.
Next, we show ∂B(0)
∂α
> 0. We obtain
∂B (0)
∂α
=
(
V [α + ρ (1− λ)]− αV
[α + ρ (1− λ)]2
)(
1− e−(α+ρ(1−λ)))+ αV
α + ρ (1− λ)e
−(α+ρ(1−λ)).
=
V
x
(
1− α
x
) (
1− e−x)+ αV
x
e−x > 0,
since α < x = α + ρ(1− λ). ♦
(ii) We can show that
∂H (0)
∂x
= − α
x2 (1− e−α)f(x) < 0,
since f(x) = (1 + x)e−x − 1 < 0 for x > 0. Hence, we obtain ∂H(0)
∂ρ
> 0 and ∂H(0)
∂(1−λ) > 0.
Next, we show ∂H(0)
∂α
< 0. We can write H(0) = 1 − g(α,y)
g(α,0)
where y = ρ + (1 − λ), and
g(α, y) = 1−e
−(α+y)
α+y
. We can write
dH (0)
dα
=
g(α, y)
g(α, 0)
[
gα(α, 0)
g(α, 0)
− gα(α, y)
g(α, y)
]
,
where
gα(α, y)
g(α, y)
=
e−(α+y)
1− e−(α+y) −
1
α + y
=
1
e(α+y) − 1 −
1
α + y
.
Let h(y) = gα(α,y)
g(α,y)
, so that
dH (0)
dα
=
g(α, y)
g(α, 0)
[h(0)− h(y)] .
Hence, dH(0)
dα
< 0 if and only if g(0) < g(y). We can write
g′(y) = − e
(α+y)
(e(α+y) − 1)2 +
1
(α + y)2
= − 1
e(α+y) − 2 + e−(α+y) +
1
(α + y)2
.
Using the power series expansions for e(α+y) and e−(α+y), we get
g′(y) = − 1
2
( ∞∑
i=1
(α+y)2i
(2i)!
) + 1
(α + y)2
> 0 for all y.
Hence, we obtain dH(0)
dα
< 0. ♦
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Appendix II: General information structures
The binomial example that has been used extensively in this paper is insightful, but it is also
a rather special case. To establish the robustness of these results, we consider a more general
class of information structures in this appendix. We assume for simplicity that re-financing
occurs at a fixed sequence of regular intervals.
Suppose there are N + 1 periods, where the period length corresponds to the maturity
of the commercial paper issued. The information revealed in each period is represented by a
random variable with a finite number of values. Without loss of generality we assume there
are S different outcomes in period n and denote them by ωn = 1, ..., S. The information
set in period n can be identified with the vector ωn = (ω1, ..., ωn) and the states of nature
can be identified with the vector ω = (ω1, ..., ωN+1) ∈ Ω = {1, ..., S}N+1. The probability of
state ω is denoted by P [ω].
Again, we assume the assets have a terminal value VN+1 (ω) in period N + 1 but no yield
in periods n = 1, ..., N and for simplicity we assume that the short-term interest rate is 0.
Our task is to calculate the maximum amount of finance that can be raised in the initial
period, before any information has been released. We compute this amount by backward
induction, starting with the last period before the assets’ value is realized. The assets are
worth V (ω) at in state ω in period N + 1 so, assuming the face value of the debt is D , the
SIV is solvent if and only if
D ≤ V (ω) .
The payoff function of the SIV is denoted by BN+1 (ω;D) and defined by
BN+1 (ω;D) =
{
D if D ≤ V (ω)
λV (ω) if D > V (ω)
,
for any state ω and face valueD. Then the expected value of the debt in periodN , conditional
on the face value D and the information set ωN , is
E
[
BN+1 (ω;D) | ωN
]
.
The maximum pledgeable value of the asset is denoted by VN
(
ωN
)
and defined by
VN
(
ωN
)
= max
D≥0
E
[
BN+1 (ω;D) | ωN
]
.
Now suppose that we have defined Bn (ω
n;D) and Vn (ω
n) for n = N − k, ..., N . For
n = N − k − 1 we define Vn (ωn) by putting
Vn (ω
n) = max
D≥0
E
[
Bn+1
(
ωn+1;D
) | ωn] .
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Then we can define Bn (ω
n;D) in the obvious way, putting
Bn (ω
n;D) =
{
D if D ≤ Vn+1 (ωn+1)
λVn+1 (ω
n+1) if D > Vn+1 (ω
n+1)
.
By induction, we have defined Vn (ω
n) for every period n = 1, ..., N and every information
set ωn. V0 is the maximum amount of finance that can be raised at the first date.
We make two assumptions that are counterparts to the parametric assumptions in the
text.
A.1 The terminal value of the asset V (ω) is bounded by V¯ < ∞ for every terminal state
ω ∈ Ω.
A.2 There exists a terminal state ω¯ = (ω¯1, ..., ω¯N+1) such that V (ω¯) = 0 and, for every
period n, P [ω¯n+1|ω¯n] ≥ 1− p > 0 .
Under the maintained assumptions we can show that
V0 ≤ pV¯ .
To prove this, we begin by considering the information set ω¯N and note that, under the
maintained assumptions A.1 and A.2, the maximum finance that can be raised must be
bounded by
E
[
V
(
ωN+1
) | ω¯N] ≤ (1− p)× 0 + pV¯ = pV¯ .
Thus, VN
(
ω¯N
) ≤ pV¯ . Now suppose that
Vn (ω¯
n) ≤
[
1 + (1− p)λ+ · · ·+ (1− p)N−n λN−n
]
pV¯
=
[
N∑
k=0
(1− p)k λk
]
pV¯
and use the maintained assumptions to conclude that the inequality holds for n− 1.
Conversely, we can show that there is a lower bound to the amount of finance that can
be raised.
A.3 For some constants v¯ > 0 and p > 0, P
[
V (ω) ≥ v¯ | ωN] ≥ pi, for any information set
ωN .
Then, under Assumption A.3, it can be shown that
Vn (ω
n) ≥ pv¯,
for any information set ωn. The proof is obvious.
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Figure 1: Bear Stearns’ liquidity pool just before its near failure (Source: SEC Chairman Christopher Cox’s letter 
to Basel Committee in support of New Guidance on Liquidity Management, available at: 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-48.htm). 
 
Figure 2: Optimistic information structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Pessimistic information structure 
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Figure 4: State transitions in the model with nested information structures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Timeline (illustrating N+1 state transitions and N rollovers). 
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Figure 6a: Haircut as a function of n for different levels of credit risk (1-p’) for λ = 0.7. 
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Figure 6b: Haircut as a function of n for different levels of liquidation risk (1-λ) for p’= .60. 
00.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48 52 56 60 64 68 72 76 80 84 88 92 96 100
D(
0)
rho
Debt Capacity (B(0)) and Rollover Risk (rho)
0.001
0.01
0.1
 
Figure 7a: Debt capacity as a function of ρ for different levels of credit risk ( 0.001,e α− =  0.01, and 0.1) for V = 1,  
and λ = 0.7. 
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Figure 7b: Haircut as a function of ρ for different levels of credit risk ( 0.001,e α− =  0.01, and 0.1) for V = 1, and λ 
= 0.7. 
